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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2812 
___________ 
 
MISAEL CORDERO, 
              Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GREGORY KELLEY, sue in their individual and official capacities;                     
STEPHEN D'LLIO, sue in their individual and official capacities                       
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-17-cv-01596) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 9, 2018 
Before:  SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed May 10, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Misael Cordero appeals from the order of the District Court denying his 
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).  We will vacate and remand 
for further proceedings. 
I. 
 Cordero is a New Jersey state prisoner who is serving a life sentence.  He filed an 
IFP application along with a proposed complaint alleging that prison officials confiscated 
his religious materials and obstructed the grievance process in violation of his First 
Amendment rights.  Cordero sought leave to proceed IFP in order to avoid prepayment of 
the $400 filing and administrative fees.  In support of his application, he submitted his 
prison account statement for the preceding six months.  The statement showed that, 
although his balance had at times exceeded $700, he had only $5.86 at the time of filing. 
 The District Court denied Cordero’s IFP application.  The District Court reasoned 
that Cordero had an income of $1,917.50 during the preceding six months, consisting of 
$45 per month in prison wages as well as gifts from his family, for an average monthly 
income of just over $300.  The District Court further reasoned that this income showed 
that Cordero could afford to prepay the fees or could have done so if he had saved his 
money.  Thus, the District Court denied Cordero’s application but gave him more time to 
pay the fees.  Cordero filed a motion for reconsideration.  The District Court denied that 
motion too but again gave Cordero more time to pay the fees.  Cordero appeals.1 
                                              
1 The denial of an IFP application is a final order over which we have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 2001) (en 
banc).  We review the District Court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.  See Jones v. 
Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1985).  We granted Cordero leave to proceed IFP 
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II. 
  Although the District Court did not expressly state as much, its denial of 
Cordero’s IFP application has both a backward-looking and a forward-looking 
component.  The backward-looking component is the District Court’s conclusion that 
Cordero could have prepaid the fees if he had saved his money instead of spending it on 
other things.  The forward-looking component is the District Court’s apparent conclusion 
that Cordero would continue to receive the same income and would be able to save and 
prepay the fees in the future if given more time.  Cordero argues that the District Court 
abused its discretion for both reasons.  Although we reject some of Cordero’s specific 
arguments, we ultimately agree. 
 First, Cordero argues that courts can never consider assets that were previously 
available to a prisoner because the IFP statute speaks solely in terms of the prisoner’s 
present ability to pay the fees.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).2  We do not appear to have 
addressed that issue in a precedential opinion.  Other Courts of Appeals, however, have 
held that courts may consider pre-filing expenditures so long as the courts inquire into the 
                                              
on this appeal but, in doing so, we expressed no opinion on the District Court’s 
assessment of the different record before it. 
 
2 Cordero relies for this proposition on a provision of the IFP statute stating that “[i]n no 
event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action . . . for the reason that the 
prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4).  That provision applies only when a prisoner already has been 
granted IFP status and a partial initial fee is assessed pursuant to the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (“PLRA”).  Thus, it does not speak to whether a prisoner should be granted 
IFP status in the first place.  The provision of the statute that does, however, also is 
phrased in terms of the prisoner’s present ability to pay. 
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nature and timing of those expenditures and give the plaintiff an opportunity to show that 
they were not a “a deliberate attempt to avoid the filing fee.”  Alexander v. Carson Adult 
High Sch., 9 F.3d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases).3  The District Court did 
not address that issue.   
The District Court also failed to otherwise properly account for Cordero’s 
expenses and for amounts that he should reasonably be able to spend in prison.  The 
District Court did not acknowledge, for example, that one third of Cordero’s wages and 
ten percent of his gifts are automatically deducted for payment toward fines and 
penalties.  Nor did the District Court make any determination regarding the nature or 
amount of Cordero’s discretionary spending.  Instead, the District Court appears to have 
assumed that all of Cordero’s discretionary spending should count against him for IFP 
purposes because his prison is required to supply him with the bare necessities of life.   
That is not the law of this Circuit.  We have repeatedly recognized that “prisoners 
are not required to surrender ‘those small amenities of life which they are permitted to 
acquire in a prison’ in order to litigate [IFP] in the district court.”  Jones, 752 F.2d at 79 
(quoting Bullock v. Suomela, 710 F.3d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 1983)).  In one case, for 
example, we explained that “[a]n account of $50.07”—roughly $230 in today’s dollars—
“would not purchase many such amenities” but that “[t]hese need not be surrendered in 
                                              
3 These cases addressed the pre-PLRA practice of assessing partial fees in order to deter 
frivolous prisoner litigation.  Under the PLRA, that purpose now is served by requiring 
prisoners granted IFP status to pay the full fees in installments.  See Abdul-Akbar, 239 
F.3d at 312.  Thus, the question now is whether a prisoner can avoid prepayment of the 
fees, not whether a prisoner can avoid payment altogether.  
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order for a prisoner . . . to litigate [IFP] in the district court.”  Souder v. McGuire, 516 
F.2d 820, 824 (3d Cir. 1975).  Thus, before denying IFP status on the basis of Cordero’s 
prior earnings and expenditures, the District Court should have more thoroughly analyzed 
the nature and timing of those expenditures, whether they were designed to avoid 
prepayment of the fees, and whether and how they exceeded the amenities that Cordero 
should not be required to surrender.4 
 Second, Cordero argues that the District Court should not have considered the 
gifts from his family, which accounted for the vast majority of his income during the 
relevant period, because his family is poor and is able to send him money only 
periodically.  We do not agree that the District Court was required to ignore the gifts 
already received for purposes of the backward-looking component of its analysis.  For 
purposes of the forward-looking component, however, the District Court should at least 
have considered that issue.  One court held in a pre-PLRA case that, in calculating a 
prisoner’s income, courts should exclude “small gifts” altogether.  In re Williamson, 786 
F.2d 1336, 1340 (8th Cir. 1986).  We have not gone that far.  See Souder, 516 F.2d at 821 
(relying on a regular recurring gift of $15 every two weeks).  Nevertheless, before 
                                              
4 The District Court relied on Shahin v. Secretary of State, 532 F. App’x 123 (3d Cir. 
2013) (per curiam), for the proposition that Cordero’s discretionary spending counted 
against him because his prison provides him with the bare necessities.  But Shahin, in 
addition to being non-precedential, is distinguishable.  In that case, a Panel of this Court 
reasoned that the plaintiff’s own income permitted her to save enough to pay the fees 
because she was married and her husband provided her “with food, clothing, shelter, 
paying her medical and travel expenses and even her business losses[.]”  Id. at 124.  The 
plaintiff in Shahin, however, was not a prisoner.  Receiving a livelihood outside prison 
from a spouse is a far cry from receiving only those bare necessities that prisons are 
required to provide. 
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concluding that Cordero would be able to earn and save enough money to prepay the fees 
within a particular period of time, the District Court should at least have considered 
whether Cordero had a reasonable expectation of receiving sufficient gifts in the future.  
We note that the account statement that Cordero submitted to this Court showed only 
about half as much in gifts as the statement he submitted to the District Court, which 
covered the December holidays. 
III. 
 For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order denying Cordero’s IFP 
application and will remand for further proceedings.  We do not hold that the District 
Court is required to grant Cordero’s application.  Instead, we hold only that the District 
Court should address the issues discussed above before making its ruling. 
